SOUTH ASIA IN TRANSITION:

FINDING STABILITY IN THE THIRD NUCLEAR AGE

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Introduction

The month of May marked 23 years since Pakistan and India tested their atomic bombs and gatecrashed the nuclear club. Commemorated as *Yaum-e-Takbeer* in Pakistan and National Technology Day in India, the anniversaries of the nuclear tests usually draw statements from political leaders reaffirming the national resolve to upgrade defence technologies and vigilance in the face of existential threats. But the force with which COVID-19 has ravaged India's populace and created a spate of socio-economic vulnerabilities in Pakistan, the order of existential priorities has been recast for both nuclear-armed neighbours. The statements issued this year were less declamatory, perhaps also to reflect the recent non-aggression pact on the Line of Control signed earlier this year, and subsequent discussions on resuming bilateral dialogue.



	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2020 Current
India	54032	54555	54361	53961	56756	56773	62567	67522	69285	71469	73001	72887
Pakistan	6179	6513	6907	7135	7496	8143	8416	9321	10524	10388	10097	10376

Table 1: Comparison of Defence Budgets of India and Pakistan Since 2010
Data Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2020

In the two decades since India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests, there have been repeat cycles of normalisation and aggression that delivered new precedents for diplomacy, as well as reappraisals for nuclear and conventional war-gaming. The more recent crises of Pulwama and Balakot in 2019 were significant for their scale of hostilities and potential risks, as both nuclear neighbours engaged in an air skirmish against one another for the first time since 1971. "A stroke of luck" deescalated the crisis,

as some have argued, and highlighted the need to fasten risk reduction measures around escalation that prevent and help manage crises.

Furthermore, international observers have questioned South Asia's nuclear security since the 1990s, particularly around the possibility of nuclear stockpiles falling into the wrong hands, or facilities infiltrated by non-state actors. This charge is levied more so at Pakistan, given its history of combatting terrorism at home, but has proven to be unfounded. The last few years have brought about greater scrutiny of India's nuclear programme, including procedures involved in disposing off nuclear material. After an incident in 2016, and two back-to-back cases in 2021, concerns regarding lax controls and poor regulatory and enforcement mechanisms have increased. On May 6, 2021, security officials confiscated 7.1 kilograms of uranium in a sting operation in Nagpur, Maharashtra. Within a span of 30 days, on June 4 it was reported that police in the state of Jharkand seized another 6.4 kilograms of radioactive material. In both the cases, it appears that the vendors were attempting to sell it online, which suggests that black marketeering and illegal mining is an empirical trend in India. While Indian officials believed that these large amounts of uranium were disposed off by factories using the material for radiation protection, this raises several serious questions about domestic nuclear governance.

Against this backdrop, this policy brief aims to assess the growing risks of a Third Nuclear Age in South Asia and its impact on strategic stability fraught with multiple challenges. While undertaking a critical assessment of the efficacy of past and present confidence building measures, the brief will offer some policy recommendations that can help insulate the region from the next phase of acrimony in Indo-Pak relations.

India-Pakistan Bilateral Agreements	
Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities	1988
India-Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons	1992
Lahore Memorandum of Understanding	1999
Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles	2005
Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons	2007

Challenges of the third nuclear age

The First Nuclear Age began with the advent of atomic weapons in 1945 and witnessed a nuclear arms race culminating in the Cold War. The major threat during this period was large conflict potentially escalating into a full-blown nuclear contest, based on concepts like deterrence, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), second-strike capabilities, and nuclear arms control. It has been argued that the existence of nuclear arms prevented major conflict during this period as both the superpowers of the time—the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union—learned to live with the bomb without annihilating the entire planet.[1]

The nuclear trajectories of India and Pakistan played out largely in the Second Nuclear Age (1989 to date), beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall that marked the Cold War's end. This period was marked by the 'horizontal proliferation' of weapons to nations other than the G5; debates on whether terrorist groups could use weapons of mass destruction; and moves towards non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and coercive disarmament.[2] Since

[1] Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, "Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons and the Onset of a Third Nuclear Age: European Journal of International Security," Cambridge Core (Cambridge University Press, February 11, 2021), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/strategic-nonnuclear-weapons-and-the-onset-of-a-third-nuclear-age/91EEB3B77D348252815F9F7B59DB8A32.
[2] Ibid.

the overt nuclearisation of South Asia, the region has rightly been termed a nuclear flashpoint as the nuclear risks were never low due to ongoing territorial issues; the emergence of bilateral crises and the absence of mutually held mechanisms to manage them. Nonetheless, India and Pakistan have engaged intermittently to manage nuclear risks and developed long term confidence building measures (CBMs) still in effect today.

South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone	***1974***
Renunciation on acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan	1978
Comprehensive mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities	1979
Simultaneous mutual acceptance of IAEA "Full Scope Safeguards"	1979
Simultaneous accession to the NPT	1979
Agreement on a mutually acceptable ratio of conventional armed forces	1981
Bilateral South Asian Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	1987
Mutual conference under the UN auspices on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia	1987
Strategic Restraint Regime	2006
Bilateral arrangement on Non-testing of Nuclear Weapons	2016

Table 3: List of Unsuccessful proposals by Pakistan

The advent of the Third Nuclear Age is marked by some significant trends on the global stage such as great power competition, the emergence of smaller nuclear powers and the introduction of destabilising emerging technologies. While all these global developments shape regional security, directly and indirectly, the following trends are predominantly important in the South Asian theatre and their impact is already visible in the policy, posture and conduct of both India and Pakistan, especially post-Pulwama/Balakot crisis of 2019. They include (a) a higher threshold for risk acceptance, (b) great power competition, (c) diffusion of emerging technologies, and (d) entanglement of nuclear and non-nuclear forces.

Higher threshold for risk acceptance: This trend began to appear in 2016, when after an attack in Uri, Indian held Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian military claimed to have conducted a "surgical strike" in Pakistan's airspace, and announced victory in destroying militant hideouts across the Line of Control (LoC). Dismissing the Indian narrative, Pakistan termed India's claims as an "illusion."[3] The questionable episode roiled domestic politics in both countries, but significantly upped the ante in South Asia's crisis dynamic. It received a muted international response, partly because of its fictive presentation, but silence on the part of United States and no condemnation of Indian claims of penetrating Pakistani territory by international partners enabled the risk of more direct confrontation in future. This confrontation occurred some months later during the Pulwama/Balakot episode.

The Pulwama/Balakot crisis marked an inflection point in South Asian strategic stability as it followed an altogether different trajectory compared to previous Indo-Pak conflicts. The usual 'circuit breakers' or 'safety valves' such as the third-party mediation (a role traditionally played by the US to diffuse tensions through back-channel diplomacy) was conspicuously missing here. On the contrary, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo termed India's strike as a "counter-terrorism action."[4] The US' acquiescence in India's favour has undermined its reliability as a neutral broker for a future crisis that requires safety valves. For the first time since 1971, India employed its air force against Pakistan, and Pakistan followed suit. Without a bilateral escalation control mechanism in place, the crisis demonstrated a higher threshold for risk acceptance from both sides.

Great power competition: South Asia has always featured prominently in great power rivalries, and the current confrontational nature of the Sino-US

[3] M Ilyas Khan, "India's 'surgical strikes' in Kashmir: Truth or illusion?" BBC News, 23 October 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37702790.

[4] Press Release, "Statement by Secretary Pompeo: Concern Regarding India-Pakistan Tensions," U.S. Embassy (Islamabad, February 27, 2019), https://pk.usembassy.gov/statement-by-secretary-pompeo-concer-regarding-india-pakistan-tensions/.

relations on one hand, and US-Russia hostility has notched up strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region, and South Asia in particular. Great power competition needs no better case study than Afghanistan's 'forever war', where international arbiters have stepped in one after another for strategic footholds. Strategic anxiety in several capitals[5] over China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and other investments under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is also well known. The strategic alignment among nations corresponds with the pace of defence procurement and technology transfers between them.

The US has bolstered India as the net security provider against China. In this process, India has acquired equipment worth around USD 20 billion from the US over the past 15 years,[6] and more recently, signed numerous defence cooperation pacts including the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (2020) for geospatial cooperation, the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (2018) the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (2016). While the bulk of these efforts may be primed against China, it has had a destabilising effect on South Asia's security equilibrium. Great power competition will intensify across the globe, and both India and Pakistan will be hard pressed to raise the stakes against each other.

[5] Kai Neagle, "Why Is China's Belt and Road Initiative Being Questioned by Japan and India?," E-International Relations, May 2, 2020, https://www.e-ir.info/2020/05/02/why-is-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-being-questioned-by-japan-and-india/.

[6] Manjeet Negi, "India, US to sign BECA deal this month-end for closer defence ties," India Today, October 19, 2020, accessed March 27, 202, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-us-beca-china-defence-ties-1733082-2020-10-19.



India-Pakistan defence expenditure (1951-2020)
Data source: SIPRI Yearbook 2020

Entanglement of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons: The entanglement can occur in three ways according to scholars: (i) through the usage of dual-use delivery systems, (ii) the commingling of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and 3) non-nuclear threats to nuclear weapons and their associated command, control, communication and information (C3I) systems.[7]

A dangerous entanglement occurred during the Pulwama/Balakot episode in 2019 when India reportedly deployed its entire naval fleet in the Arabian Sea at the beginning of the crisis, including the newly commissioned *Arihant* submarine which can carry nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. India's plan to launch dual capable *Prithvi* missiles against six targets in Pakistan also increased the risk of miscalculation.[8]

[7] James M. Acton, ed., Entanglement: Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017, 50.
[8] Mansij Asthana, "Why Did Indian Army Select Prithvi Missiles to Strike Pakistan After The Deadly 2019 Aerial Skirmish?", The Eurasian Times, March 1, 2021, https://eurasiantimes.com/why-india-chose-to-deploy-prithvi-missiles-near-pakistan-border/.

There was a rapid movement on the escalation ladder that nullified the theory of escalation control. It amply demonstrated India's "flirtation with pre-emptive counterforce"[9], given credence by a national debate over India's no first use (NFU) policy. Senior government officials have stated that the policy is 'circumstantial' and may change in the future. The deliberate haze around this issue works to India's advantage, and raises the risk of entanglement manifold in a future conflict.

Diffusion of emerging technologies: The emergence of disruptive technologies such as cyber weapons, artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, outer space developments and remote sensing technologies have challenged the traditional notions of stability by adding layers of complexity to most conflict theatres. The technological revolution is dramatically changing the conduct of warfare by facilitating non-contact war options, increasing mobility and ease of operations. It comes with lethal consequences, as amply demonstrated in the Israel-Palestine conflict in May 2021, where machine learning and algorithm-driven warfare turned into power multipliers for the Israeli military.[10] Both India and Pakistan are pursuing and employing technologies that are disruptive and destabilising. In the event of a crisis, cyber space can be exploited by non-state actors as well.

India is strengthening its strategic capabilities indigenously and has successfully tested a hypersonic vehicle in pursuit of nuclear-capable cruise missiles.[11] India and Pakistan are also developing unmanned aerial vehicles

[9] Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, "India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities," *International Security*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Winter 2018/19), pp. 7–52, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00340.

[10] Younis Dar, "Israel Says It Fought World's First 'Artificial Intelligence War' Against Hamas," The Eurasian Times, May 29, 2021, https://eurasiantimes.com/israel-sys-it-fought-worlds-first-artificial-intelligence-war-against-hamas/.

[11] Kelsey Davenport, "India Tests Hypersonic Missile" Arms Control today, October 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-10/news/india-tests-hypersonic-missile.

(UAVs) drones that have both warfighting capabilities and an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) role. The potential use of drones with precision guided munitions will be a dangerous combination for future wars.

Additionally, the Pulwama/Balakot crises suggest that land centric warfare may have been overtaken by air and naval options. The bulk of strategic learning in India and Pakistan has centred around land warfare, and the spatial shift to air or naval, along with the induction of new disruptive technologies would be a major challenge in the nuclear environment.

Finding space for peace: Potential areas for reconnect

The reaffirmation of the 2003 ceasefire agreement by DGMOs of both India and Pakistan on February 25, 2021, and subsequent official statements to normalise bilateral relations offered an opportunity to review the nuclear domain as well. After several weeks of an accelerated exchange between New Delhi and Islamabad, there is some scepticism over whether a dialogue process will resume. Diplomatic relations had been sequentially dismantled over the last few years, and it will take a reasonable timeline before diplomats commit to an open process of exchange.

Picking up the pieces again means taking a hard look at the bilateral agenda from 2014. The last set of CBMs concerning the full spectrum of bilateral issues were shared and debated right up until the Modi government assumed power in India. The rapid decline of relations hit rock bottom in 2019 with the revocation of Kashmir's status by New Delhi. It is unwise to expect that fundamental issues like Kashmir can be papered over by other CBMs, or that a ceasefire agreement will lead to a dialogue process.

All the same, there is adequate realisation among decision makers in both India and Pakistan that nuclear conflict will lead to mutual annihilation. Both countries have undertaken CBMs in the past to maintain strategic stability

and prevent cross-border violence from snowballing into inadvertent war, particularly through the Lahore Declaration (1999) framework, which is still the baseline for such a dialogue. Recent attempts by Indian and Pakistani authorities to engage in a 'back channel' provide an opportunity to talk about nuclear CBMs further down the road, albeit the environment surrounding the current thaw in relations is vastly different. It is uncertain how far this engagement will carry, or with what effects. The following set of recommendations provide policy inputs for decision makers to consider during upcoming rounds of dialogue.

Recommendations

- First and foremost, solidify existing gains: the recent reaffirmation of the 2003 Ceasefire Agreement is significant but not sacrosanct, and there are reports of violation from both sides even as both sides are talking.[12] India and Pakistan must consider formalising the 2003 Ceasefire Agreement and commit to a complete cessation of hostilities across the LoC, which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties last winter alone. Data confirms that the ceasefire agreement drastically reduces violence on LOC as well as in Kashmir,[13] therefore, efforts must be made to move in this positive direction. U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) can be asked to monitor violations with greater vigilance, at least on Pakistan's side.

- Greater clarity in nuclear policies and postures is required. Post Balakot, triumphant declarations by both sides suggested that both India and Pakistan drew divergent lessons from the episode and

[12] India violates ceasefire agreement, The News, May 5, 2021, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/830737-india-violates-ceasefire-agreement.

[13] Indo-Pak Conflict Monitor ceasefire violation data quoted by Happymon Jacob on twitter, February 25, 2021. https://twitter.com/HappymonJacob/status/1364926652111749120/photo/1.

increased the risk of miscalculation in future crises. Nuclear deterrence may well be about surprise, but the addition of disruptive technologies necessitates an assurance about posture. The risk of entangling nuclear and non-nuclear weapons has increased with India's counterforce temptations[14] and deliberate ambiguity in its No First Use (NFU) policy.[15]

- It is important to employ failsafe escalation control mechanisms to avoid miscalculation and risk of inadvertent escalation. Establishing and maintaining secure lines of communications that work reliably even under extreme conditions is critical.[16] The 2005 hotline between Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries was tactical in nature and has been dysfunctional for the most part. Reactivating previously agreed upon hotlines is a first step; they need to be secured and expanded at a strategic level as well. One step would be to establish a direct communication link between the National Command Authority in Pakistan and the Nuclear Command Authority in India to share accurate information and dispel miscommunication during crises.[17]

- Scholars and practitioners of nuclear stability in both India and Pakistan should work to create a common language of nuclear

[14] Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, "India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities," *International Security*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Winter 2018/19), pp. 7–52, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00340.

[15] Ajai Shukla, "Rajnath Singh says India could use nukes first if circumstances demand", Business Standard, August 17, 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/rajnath-singh-says-india-could-use-nukes-first-if-circumstances-demand-119081601939_1.html.

[16] Sahil Shah, "Zoom Won't Stop a Nuclear War" Foreign Policy, April 19, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/19/zoom-hotline-red-telephone-nuclear-war-cuban-missile-crisis/.

[17] Harry Hannah, A hotline between National and Nuclear Command Authorities to Manage Tensions," South Asian Voices, July 24, 2019, https://southasianvoices.org/hotline-between-command-authorities-to-manage-tensions/.

deterrence.[18] Most strategic lexicon is borrowed from Cold War era debates, some of which are irrelevant or inapplicable in South Asia's context. For example, criticism over Pakistan's short-range missiles having a delegative command and control, originates from Cold War definitions of tactical nuclear weapons in European theatres. Pakistan claims to have a central command and control system, but the persistent misperception raises the risk of miscalculation by adversaries.

- Both India and Pakistan have successfully adhered to some nuclear CBMs such as the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities (1988) and the Pre-Notification of Missile Tests. India and Pakistan can further strengthen and expand these by adding additional commitments within this framework. The non-attack pledge under the 1988 agreement prohibits a kinetic attack but does not explicitly exclude a cyber-attack on nuclear facilities, thereby leaving space for such a possibility. An annexure could be negotiated offering a commitment by both states to exclude the option of a cyber attack on nuclear facilities. It can be further expanded to include additional facilities such as nuclear command and control centres, early warning systems and critical computer networks[19] to forestall potential risks of entanglement. Likewise, pre-notification of missile tests only covers ballistic missile tests, and can be upgraded to include a prior notification for cruise missile tests as well.

[18] Rabia Akhtar, Adil Sultan, Manpreet Sethi, Rukmani Gupta "The language of nuclear deterrence in South" Webinar at the the Centre of Science and Security Studies (CSSS), King's College, April 8, 2021, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/events/the-language-of-nuclear-deterrence-in-south-asia.

[19] Sitara Noor, "India-Pakistan Nuclear CBMs: Addressing Mutual Concerns," South Asian Voices, May 17, 2016, https://southasianvoices.org/india-pakistan-nuclear-cbms-adressing-mutual-concerns/.

- Nuclear accidents at military or civilian facilities can lead to extraordinary safety risks and challenges for public health and environment. In 2017, India and Pakistan successfully renewed the 2007 bilateral Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons for another five years till 2022.[20] However, this agreement is limited to nuclear weapon accidents only, whereas, the scope of this nuclear safety agreement can be expanded to cover all nuclear incidents at civilian and military facilities. Under the IAEA's Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, both countries are encouraged to develop bilateral or multilateral arrangements for exchange of information in case of a nuclear accident, considering the transboundary impact of such an emergency.

- Furthermore, India and Pakistan can consider bilateral nuclear disaster management measures to address potential incidents that have a transboundary impact.[21] Under the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, countries are encouraged to "cooperate between themselves and with the IAEA to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimise its consequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases."[22]

- Pakistan and India must consider reducing the potential risk of nuclear terrorism in the region. They may establish special

[20] "Pakistan, India extend nuclear safety agreement," Express Tribune, February 21, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1334606/pakistan-india-extend-nuclear-safety-agreement.
[21] Sitakanta Mishra, Mansoor Ahmed, "Cooperative Measures to Support the Indo-Pak Agreement on Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons," Sandia Report SAND 2014-2607, April 2014, https://www.sandia.gov/cooperative-monitoring-center/_assets/documents/sand2014-2607.pdf.

[22] IAEA, "Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency," INFCIRC/336, November 18, 1986, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc336.shtml.

communication links for notification of any nuclear security incident such as theft of nuclear or radioactive material. This may be supplemented with cooperative measures at borders to interdict illicit trafficking of nuclear or radiological materials.[23] After the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), both India and Pakistan are obligated to have additional measures and learning from one another's experience in security of civilian nuclear programme.

- India and Pakistan can establish technical and scientific cooperation in the civilian nuclear domain. Under the IAEA's Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific (RCA), both India and Pakistan are part of numerous regional activities that could be formalised into bilateral initiatives. Both countries have established nuclear safety and security centres of excellence that can be used as venues to share best practices bilaterally and regionally.

- India and Pakistan may consider formalising their respective moratorium on nuclear testing into a bilateral agreement. This will create necessary confidence and pave the way for simultaneous signing and ratification of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Nuclear Safety, Security & Cooperation Agreements		
	India	Pakistan
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships	1962	--------
Food and Agriculture Organisation/United Nations - nuclear projects	1964	1964
The Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific (RCA)	1972	1974
Convention Concerning the Protection of Workers Against Ionizing Radiation	1976	--------

[23] Ibid.

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency	1988	1989
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident	1988	1989
Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste	1990	1990
Convention on Nuclear Safety	1994	1994
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)	2002	2000
CPPNM 2005 Amendment	2007	2016
Arms Control/Non-Proliferation Agreements		
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies	1967	1967
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water	1963	1963
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other WMD on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor	1973	--------
Biological weapons Convention	1973	1972
Chemical Weapons Convention	1993	1993
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	2006	---------
Other multilateral arrangements		
IAEA code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources • ***Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources*** • ***Supplementary Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources***	Member Yes No	Member Yes Yes
UN Security Council Resolutions 1540	2004	2004
UN Security Council Resolutions 1673	2006	2006
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism	2006	2007
IAEA Additional Protocol	2009	-------
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation	2016	-------
Missile Technology Control Regime	2016	-------
Wassenaar Arrangement	2017	-------
Australia Group	2018	-------

Table 4: Multilateral Agreements