Flash Point
Istanbul on Standby: Will the Taliban Control their Militants?
Date: November 4, 2025
Mansoor Ahmad Khan
Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan
Pakistan-Afghanistan escalation reflects the burden of historical factors coupled with the inability of the two states to manage contemporary relations. Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, Pakistan has applied all sorts of pressure on the Afghan interim government to rein in TTP’s support network on Afghan soil. However, terrorism has continued to increase, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in recent weeks. The relations have not stabilised and broadened in a manner that created stakes that could become a factor in enhancing cooperation in various fields, including combating terrorism. The stalemate finally led to military escalation from both sides. There must be a strategy behind all options being exercised in the relations with key countries. In the case of Afghanistan, dialogue and talks should be a preferred option. However, since the developments have already led to military escalation during the past several days, the focus has to be on exploring all possibilities for having talks with the Afghan side on a wider agenda of relations, including counter-terrorism, trade, economic exchanges and people-to-people relations. In view of the complexity of the prevailing situation, countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and China can be approached to play a facilitative role. India and Afghanistan are independent to have their own relations. For Pakistan, the bigger challenge is working on its own channel of engagement with Afghanistan. If Pakistan-Afghanistan relations show signs of rapprochement and improvement, the space for India’s strategic gains in Afghanistan would remain limited. On the other hand, if Pakistan-Afghanistan relations continue to remain fractured and gaps continue to increase, it would not augur well for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and prospects of regional connectivity between South Asia and Central Asia through Afghanistan. It would also mean shifting of regional alignments under ongoing geopolitical changes. This type of escalation between Pakistan and Afghanistan is unprecedented. If the fundamental issues relating to this escalation are addressed by the two sides without any delay, the Islamabad-Kabul equation would come under increasing pressure. It would have a negative impact on the stability of the Afghan-Pakistan border region, the movement of the people, trade/transit and economic activities between the two countries. Such a course would not be in the interest of the fraternal relations of the two countries, and both governments should take all possible measures to change the course and address the underlying causes.
Amina Khan
Director of the Centre for Afghanistan, Middle East & Africa (CAMEA) at the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISSI)
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have been on a downward trajectory, experiencing formidable challenges, primarily due to the mismanagement of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as the security of the border has increasingly been undermined by a dramatic rise in terrorist attacks by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), operating from Afghanistan’s territory.
The resurgence of the TTP has not only exacerbated Pakistan’s security challenges but also further strained the already fragile bilateral ties. Pakistan’s frustration has deepened due to the Taliban’s perceived indifference and ineffectiveness in curbing the TTP’s activities. Islamabad views the Taliban’s response as not merely a matter of capacity but also as a reflection of unwillingness and a lack of political will to tackle the growing security threat. This has significantly eroded trust and cooperation between the two countries, complicating efforts to build a more stable and constructive partnership. The Afghan Taliban’s consistent denial of the presence of the TTP on Afghan soil notwithstanding, several developments suggest otherwise. The Afghan Taliban’s facilitation of dialogue with the TTP, which led to a ceasefire in June 2022, and their offer to relocate TTP members, clearly indicate that the de facto authorities are not only providing refuge to the group but also have significant leverage over it. While Pakistan has consistently pressed the AIG for decisive action against the TTP, it has received indifference and even stonewalling. This indifference in addressing Pakistan’s legitimate concerns remains a major point of tension. While Islamabad recognises the potential limitations that the AIG face in countering the TTP, particularly the fear that taking strong action could push the group to align with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), this approach is ultimately shortsighted.
The TTP’s growing strength and its expanding transnational terrorist alliances make it an increasingly formidable adversary. This poses not only a heightened threat to Pakistan but also risks undermining the Taliban’s own stability. The TTP’s rise could jeopardise any long-term prospects for the AIG’s rule in Afghanistan, as the group’s power and potential to challenge the
The number of Afghan Taliban within Afghanistan increases. While the Taliban have made efforts to combat ISKP, their response to the TTP has been notably less resolute, revealing a clear disparity in their approach to different security challenges. The Afghan Taliban have adopted a compartmentalised strategy, prioritising the concerns of certain countries, particularly neighbouring states, over others. This selective approach to countering threats is flawed, as security challenges are interconnected and affect all countries uniformly, especially given the transnational nature of these terrorist networks. All security threats must be accorded due importance with equal urgency to ensure that none are overlooked or neglected at the expense of others.
The Afghan Taliban face a critical and straightforward decision: If they wish to be recognised as legitimate members of the international community, they must adhere to established norms and obligations. This includes acting as a responsible stakeholder in regional and global security by refraining from harbouring or supporting terrorist groups, an obligation clearly outlined in the Doha Agreement, which they signed. Furthermore, the Afghan Taliban must assess what is truly in their long-term interest: Securing stable governance within Afghanistan in a peaceful and secure neighbourhood, or continuing to appease militant groups at the risk of their own survival? Allowing terrorist groups to operate unchecked is not only detrimental to regional security but also poses a direct threat to the Taliban’s own rule. These groups are transnational and interdependent; if allowed to grow unchecked, they will inevitably turn on the Taliban, undermining their authority and stability. The Afghan Taliban must recognise that confronting these groups is not only essential for regional peace but also critical to their long-term survival as a governing entity.
Since August 2021, Pakistan has been exercising restraint and patience, hoping the Afghan Taliban would act on Pakistan’s concerns about the TTP. Following what Islamabad perceived as a callous and inadequate response, and amid a surge in military casualties, Pakistan was compelled to revise its policy and undertake kinetic operations against TTP hideouts in Afghanistan to safeguard its national security. By targeting TTP militant bases inside Afghanistan, Islamabad aims to eliminate cross-border threats, compel the Afghan Taliban to take its security concerns seriously, and demonstrate both its resolve and capacity to defend its territorial integrity and respond decisively to attacks. These actions also underscore Pakistan’s regional role and seek to draw international attention to the Afghan Taliban’s failure to rein in extremist groups and their inability to uphold commitments made under the Doha Agreement
India’s renewed outreach may not immediately reshape the regional order, but it does complicate the strategic landscape. Growing Indo-Kabul ties could further strain Islamabad’s already tense relationship with the Afghan Taliban by fueling mistrust, particularly given Pakistan’s longstanding concerns about Indian support to the TTP and its broader view of any Indian presence in Afghanistan through a security-focused lens. This engagement may also reduce Pakistan’s leverage, particularly if the Afghan Taliban use their ties with New Delhi as a counterbalance in diplomatic dealings. The rift could widen further if the Taliban continue to dismiss Pakistan’s concerns over TTP sanctuaries while simultaneously deepening engagement with India. Moreover, in light of India’s recent anti-Pakistan remarks concerning Afghanistan, there is a growing apprehension that the region may once again become a battleground for proxy conflicts, echoing past patterns of indirect rivalry and strategic competition.
Fahd Humayun
Asst. Professor of Political Science, Tufts University
While hostilities on both sides may well continue to simmer, it comes with some relief that talks in Istanbul have been successful for now. It is also helpful that regional partners have offered to monitor violations along the border, which could allow both Islamabad and Kabul the space to return to constructive engagement, which includes restoring the movement of goods and people, given that everyday trade of food staples is a vital lifeline for both countries.
There’s little doubt that the sharp escalation in violence between Pakistan and Afghanistan in recent months had been a long time coming, given the sharp uptick in attacks on Pakistani security forces and soldier casualties that included officer-ranked personnel. While Pakistan has long maintained that the interim Taliban government should take firm action against militants operating in Afghanistan, it was the Taliban’s continued obfuscation of its support for proxies that prompted retaliatory, kinetic measures by Pakistan. In carrying strikes on militant targets inside Afghanistan, Pakistan broadly sought to achieve two objectives: to dismantle TTP operational infrastructure, and to communicate to Kabul that its continued provision of safe havens to anti-Pakistan militants now constitutes a red line.
India’s renewed outreach to Kabul at this juncture is unlikely to be a coincidence, with New Delhi potentially viewing the widening rift between Islamabad and the Taliban regime as an opportunity to reclaim some of the influence it lost in the region following the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021. Pakistan has long accused India of backing anti-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan, and this present spell of its overt engagement with the Taliban leadership is likely to reinforce suspicions of a broader joint effort to use the western border to destabilise Pakistan. That perception, along with Pakistan’s own frustrations with the Afghan Taliban, likely influenced a subsequent Foreign Office statement calling into question the Taliban regime’s political legitimacy — a nuanced yet likely consequential shift for both Islamabad and Kabul’s security calculations henceforth, the most recent mediation notwithstanding.
