Looking Ahead at 2025

Foreign Policy Grey Rhinos

Date: January 3, 2025

Senator Sherry Rehman
President, Jinnah Institute

2025 promises to be a year defined by extraordinary disruption, in an era of staggering shifts in human history. Countries like Pakistan will need to map change in order to respond to strategic global shifts that pose threats to stability, impacting both predictability and management of risk. None of the crisis trend lines can be called black swans; they are instead called grey rhinos because while they are not unexpected they still shock when they erupt.

The European war theatre has already led to challenges in energy and food security, triggering a cost of living crisis in many countries, especially those struggling with high levels of inflation like Pakistan.

At a closer pivot, the recent fall of Assad’s regime in Syria has alerted all players about the chessboard unfolding a little too conveniently for Israel’s expansionary model of settler colonialism, embedded at the same time in a volatile mix of extremist militancy. Navigating policy in such a hotbed of competing interests, including Turkiye, among others like the US, Russia, Iran and others will be a test of Islamabad’s diplomacy.

Closer to home, in case Iran and Israel go beyond the retaliatory signalling of limited war and seek to contain conflict, there may be an opening for a fragile settlement if President Trump 2.0 seeks legacy bargains, but any imposition of an unjust “peace” that accepts or normalises Israel’s colonising gains in Gaza, West Bank and Lebanon will not be seen as legitimate in Pakistan, and certainly not in Iran. Pakistan will do best to hedge its close ties with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two energy titans of the Middle East, so any conflict escalation will present challenges. Pakistan can certainly play a role in mitigating this conflict, but will need to continue balancing the diplomatic tightrope between the two powers.

The forgotten war in Afghanistan, which has left deep aftershocks on our part of the world, continues to impact the daily lives of citizens, first-responders and military personnel in border provinces, as well as casting a shadow on foreign investment. With an uptick of 40 % in militancy, Pakistan’s internal conflict spectrum is already responding to current spikes in terrorist activity originating from our western border.

The Biden administration’s parting sanctions on Pakistan’s ICBM program are to be taken seriously. Despite the fact that Indian ICBM’s obviously possess a higher strike range than Pakistan’s, the enduring neuralgia in the American defence establishment with Islamabad’s nuclear program and its delivery potential is a worry that needs to be addressed, and if possible allayed. A series of strategic dialogue rounds with the United States is entirely called for in 2025, with a new administration.

Perhaps the most dangerous dynamic between India and Pakistan will continue to be a shared overconfidence in their own ability to control escalation and a surety that the other will exercise strategic restraint, preventing the ramping up of a small-scale conventional conflict to the nuclear level. Any big disruption in the Indo-Pacific theatre will present a clear and present danger for Islamabad in balancing sides between two competing global powers, with Beijing as Pakistan’s largest investor, and the United States the largest trade partner. Any zero-sum behaviour will impose costs on Islamabad’s trade, credit lines and balance of payment numbers.

At another but potentially seismic level, with Trump 2.0 pushing high trade tariffs with China and other countries, Pakistan will have to brace for the predicted cracks in the global order that drove trade,currency and economic activities in 2024. They are likely to be subject to accelerated weaponisation in more intensified potential decouplings of what used to be a system on path to global integration. Because of supply chain breaks these wars will have a high potential of disruption in the system, along with a fresh search for innovation-nationalism as a path to building guardrails for protectionist goals. In either case, for many countries, efficiency will be replaced by resilience as economic outcomes.

Lastly, as we saw in 2024, many global “givens” such as a consensus on climate action are opening up again for contestation, which means a loss of protection from crucial multilateral agreements. The path to global de-warming is not on a stable trajectory, which means enhanced climate risk for frontline nations like Pakistan, high on the vulnerability index. While Pakistan should use both diplomacy and action at global forums, the likelihood of expecting a big finance windfall, or even extracting justice from existing wins like Loss and Damage Funds are unlikely if we are unable to leverage our standing with the G77 group at multilateral tables. Pakistan’s diplomacy is still old-school, and not pivoted to aggressively promoting commercial gains, or articulating security concerns beyond the boilerplate templates. This will have to change, especially at multilateral tables, where Pakistan has an opportunity as a non-permanent member of the Security Council to preside this year in July.