Looking Ahead

The Water Crisis: Domestic Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges

Date: January 8, 2026

Ahmad Rafay Alam
Environmental lawyer and activist

Water remained on the central stage of Pakistani news and politics throughout most of 2025. First the furore in Sindh over the proposed construction of several canals in Punjab (including in Cholistan); then the “abrogation” of the Indus Water Treaty by India after a tragic and cowardly terrorist attack in Pehalgam – which India tried to pin on Pakistan without any proof; and then the floods of June-September in Gilgit Baltistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Indian and Pakistani Punjabs.

Each of these episodes offers lessons and insights into what water challenges Pakistan may face, both internally and regionally, in 2026.

Sindh objected to the Federal Government’s Special Initiatives Facilitation Council’s plan to extend canals and canal command areas in 6 different areas of Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan, ostensibly for corporate farming and for securing food security. Never mind, none of Pakistan’s numerous Federal and Provincial policies on water, agriculture and food security mention the need for corporate farming to secure food security or indeed the need to extend canal command areas (except in the case of the Kachi Canal in Balochistan).

Under the Pakistani Constitution, inter-provincial water disputes may be referred to the Council of Common Interests for adjudication. The Council can either adjudicate the complaint or request the President to establish a commission to do so. Since its creation by the 1973 Constitution, the Council of Common Interests has been referred several disputes but has not finally adjudicated any of them. Even in 2025, Sindh’s complaint wasn’t decided. What was decided was to try and evolve a consensus on the canal initiative before moving forward.

By not adjudicating water disputes in a transparent and legal manner, the Council has failed to develop a body of precedent that could be used to reduce inter-provincial water-related tensions in the future. Water law in Pakistan would not be so contentious if lawyers had a corpus of decisions to refer to and provide clarity on new disputes. The Water Apportionment Accord of 1991, which the Indus River System Authority was established to implement, is no longer fit for purpose, and the Council and provinces must learn to share water based on international water principles of equitable and reasonable use rather than basic apportionment.

The unilateral abrogation by India of the Indus Water Treaty (which is not possible under international law) saw several myths about the Treaty busted. Firstly, we learnt that India cannot in any effective way stop or block the flow of the waters of the Western Rivers. The run-of-river dams constructed by India on the Western Rivers (the Nimoo-Bazgoo, Salal, Dul Hasti, Uri, Baghliar and Kishenganga) in total can store no more than 0.4% of their waters at present. We also know that building storage on these rivers will take years and will flood large portions of the Occupied Kashmir Valley. Secondly, we learnt that the construction of large storage dams isn’t a guarantee of flood control or of the ability to flood Pakistan through “water terrorism”. As storage in the Thein, Bhakra and Pong dams on the Eastern rivers filled to the brim by early August, massive precipitation in late August and September forced Indian dam engineers to carry out “controlled spillages”. The consequence: the flooding of several hundred villages in Indian Punjab and the collapse of several gates at Head Marala. And none of these controlled spillages caused the Ravi or Sutlej to flood beyond historic highs. Thirdly, with India no longer sharing river flow information with Pakistan via the Permanent Indus Commission, we learnt that is possible to use satellite data as well as a VPN to get up-to-date information and news on flooding in the Western and Eastern Rivers from Indian meteorological and news sources. In other words, the Treaty is becoming more of a relic than of any use in the 21st Century.

Meanwhile, there were at least three different types of flood events that took place in the summer. In GB, we saw rivers of rock and debris – a consequence of glacier lake outburst floods, which in turn are caused by global warming. In KP, we witnessed cloud bursts – although there was some dispute over what the definition of this meteorological phenomenon is – that caused flash floods, especially in Swat and Buner. And in Punjab, all five of the Provinces’ rivers flooded at the same time. There was also a “low flood” in the Indus in Sindh, but nothing that the province couldn’t manage.

In GB and KPK, we saw weaknesses in early warning systems and immediate rescue and relief efforts. Some communities in KPK were left days before any emergency supplies could reach them. And in Punjab, despite good and accurate weather forecasting, we saw the failure of rescue and relief, especially in South Punjab in September.

The floods in Pakistan were both a result of climate change and of unprecedented Western Disturbance winds throughout July and September. These Western winds created low-pressure areas in KPK ideal for cloud bursts (regardless of definition) and flash flooding. And these winds collided with the Monsoon system, forcing rain into the mountainous regions of Indian Uttarakhand, Himachal and Occupied Jammu & Kashmir. As Sunita Narain of the Centre for Science and Environment said: “Something strange is happening in the sky.” Normally, the Monsoon doesn’t reach the mountains with such force. Indeed, this year, for the first time in recorded history, the collision of weather systems caused Monsoon clouds to scale into the Tibetan Plateau and rain there.

Pakistan needs to address how it resolves inter-provincial water disputes. It needs to understand that India’s ability to manipulate water into Pakistan is extremely limited in the short- to medium term. And Pakistan must understand the climate crisis is relentless, and we will see many more floods. Pakistan must be better prepared.